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Spinelli and Fratianni on Inflation: A Comment 
In the December 1980 issue of this Review , two articles appeared on inflation in Italy (Spinelli and 
Fratianni): in both articles, the authors express certain critical remarks on some of my views on this subject. 
A brief comment on such remarks is called for. 
In several writings (e.g. Sylos Labini 1974), I have considered three equations for interpreting the 
short run (yearly) changes of wages in different historical stages of industrial capitalism: 
 
 
 
where W is the wage rate in manifacturing industry, U the rate of unemployment, V the cost of living, TUP 
the trade union pressure, quantified, for instance, by the days lost for strikes; ∆ indicates a rate of change. 
Equation (1) is largely applicable to the period up to the first world war; equation (2) holds good for the 
forty or fifty years after 1920; equation (3) applies to the last fifteen years or so. The change depends on the 
growth of trade unions, which were relatively weak in the last century , stronger in this century and even 
stronger in recent times, particularly after the "wage explosion". In the last century, owing to the weakness 
of the unions, wages in certain years were increasing less than prices in prosperous periods (wages were 
"sticky") and decreasing more than prices in recessions: only in the "long run" - as a rule, the duration of a 
business cycle - did real wages recoup temporary losses or increase. When the unions had become strong 
enough, they were normally able to avoid cuts in real wages even in the short run (year by year) and often 
succeeded in obtaining increases; this they achieved by means of strikes and, in certain countries, also by 
means of escalators clauses. During recent years the trade unions in certain countries have become so 
strong, due in part to the support of the government, as to be able to launch, intermittently, lengthy strikes 
to obtain not only wage rises considerably bigger than price rises, but also other pecuniary and non-
pecuniary advantages. This is why in the wage equation a third variable is useful, though it must be clear 
that such a variable is not and cannot be significant every year: in the first world war a battle of Verdun was 
not fought every month or even every year. 
This introduction was necessary to dissipate certain misunderstandings that I have found in both the 
articles under examination. 
In discussing the cost-push hypothesis explaining inflation, Spinelli concentrates his criticisms on the 
"discretional component" in the process of wage determination, which, as far as I am concerned, is 
represented by the third variable of equation (3), i.e. the number of days lost by strikes, which I have 
suggested as a possible (but not as the only conceivable) index of trade union "pushfulness". 
Now, the cost push does not necessarily come from that discretional component in wage 
determination: it may come from various elements of the cost of living; in the sector of industrial prices an 
increase in raw material and oil prices is a cost push, even if the prices of these commodities rise owing to 
an expansion of demand. As for the trade union pushfulness, I have always thought that this variable can be 
really significant only in those "hot" years characterized by lenghty strikes, like 1963 and 1970. In fact, 
when Del Monte discussed with me the possibility of using, in his analysis, a dummy for those two years 
instead of the "strike variable", I had no objection (Del Monte 1973 ). In my judgement, the relevance of 
the trade unions appears principally and continuously in the very structure of wage equation number 2, 
which includes the cost of living; for the classical economists and for Marx, money wages were influenced 
by the cost of living, not in the "short" but in the "long" run (several years) , for reasons related to the 
efficiency of the workers. As a matter of fact, as Phillips has shown, in the past century the changes in 
consumer prices affected wages in the short run only discontinuously. 
Spinelli is particularly interested in demonstrating that there is no long-run trade-off  between wage 
inflation and unemployment. This view goes back to Friedman, according to which the Phillips curve has a 
certain validity only in the short run; in the long run, wages do not depend on uneployment, which, on the 
other hand, tends towards a "natural rate", determined by (mysterious) real factors. Thus, all the attempts of 
the government to reduce unemployment below that rate by means of an expansionary policy have the 
effect of reducing it only temporarily: the lasting effect is an increase in prices. 
I have always pointed out that my three wage equations apply only to the short run; for the long run, 
the variations of wages tend to approximate those of the value of average productivity (Sylos Labini 1974, 
pp. 94-5). In otherwords, fundamentally I agree that unemployment affects short-run fluctuations of wages 
but not their trend. However, in the long run unemployment and wages are not unconnected. Whatever the 
cause of wage increases, when such increases exceed those of productivity systematically and for a non-
negligible number of years, they can in certain conditions erode the profit margins in industry. Such an 
erosion can slow down the expansion of investment and therefore the increase of employment (Sylos Labini 
1974, pp. 151-57). Then, in the long run unemployment can increase as a consequence of sustained 
increases of wages. Such a relation, however, is different from the Phillips relation (↑U→↓∆W), since it 
works in the apposite direction (↑∆W→↓U). 
All these observations go far beyond the question of the "strike variable". I have recalled them merely 
to make clear how secondary this question is in an analysis of the relations between wage inflation and 
unemployment. 
Michele Fratianni, referring to the views of Spinelli, criticizes an allegedly purely sociological 
explanation of inflation, according to which inflation would depend on a wage push, due, not to market 
conditions, but to "a complex array of non-economic factors". Since Fratianni quotes approvingly the 
criticism that Spinelli addresses to me and other economists concerning the "autonomous" wage push, I 
must point out that I consider this push, not in isolation, but together with endogenous pushes coming from 
the labour market and from the variations in consumer prices; I must also point out that, later on (p. 525), 
Fratianni himself accepts the idea that in certain years (such as 1970) an autonomous wage push can in fact 
take place (he calls it, in this second passage, "exogenous"). Then Fratianni emphasizes that a bi-directional 
causality between prices and wages can be found - a concept quite clearly embodied in the analysis worked 
out in my 1967 essay from which he quotes (Sylos Labini 1974). 
In criticizing a certain version of the cost-push explanation of inflation that he attributes to me, 
Fratianni writes: 1) such a version "begins with the assertion that sustained increases in the general price 
level result from the market power of large monopalistic firms which have complete control aver price 
determination"; 2) "prices are determined jointly by both demand and supply schedules and not by supply 
forces alone"; 3) since "the ability of a large monopalistic firm to set a price can explain at best changes in 
relative prices but not a continued increase in the general price level", then, "to explain the inflation of the 
recent past, one would have to seriously entertain the empirical proposition that accelerations of inflation 
are accompanied by a larger (and larger) degree of monopolization" - a proposition (p. 50) that Fratianni 
judges to be "self-evidently disconfirmed by facts". 
Fratianni addresses these criticisms not only to me, but also to other economists, particularly 
Galbraith. I am sorry to say that, as far as I am concerned, these criticisms radically misrepresent my views. 
I have always emphasized that large firms operating in concentrated industries, as well as relatively small 
firms operating in highly differentiated industries, are far from having complete control over prices: their 
market power meets with important limitations in the home market as well as from abroad - so much so that 
they are able to shift on to prices only those cost increases that are general, though not necessarily equal to 
all firms, and, at least in the short run, not even fully (see e.g. Sylos Labini 1979). Those limitations are 
such as to determine, under certain circumstances, a systematic deterioration of profit margins and of the 
share of net profits in manufacturing, and thus reduce the self-financing capacity of the firms and compel 
them to increase the burden of external debt, as I have repeatedly pointed out. These observations apply, not 
only to the first, but also to the third of the above assertions (acceleration of inflation and increasing degree 
of monopoly). 
As for the second assertion, I suggest that the cost-push theorists are not so remiss as to forget that 
goods, once produced, have to be sold to people who demand them. The point is that, if we assume that 
normally, industrial firms have unused capacity and that direct costs per unit are constant, at least in the 
relevant range of output, it follows that changes in demand determine changes in output, not in prices. 
These two are precisely the assumptions that I explicitly make and work out; nowadays, the empirical 
evidence in favour of both seems to be considerable. After distinguishing several categories of prices, one 
would find that, in fact, demand has a direct role in price variations of certain types of goods, e.g. 
agricultural products and mineral raw materials; in particular circumstances, even the prices of industrial 
products can be directly affected. I have worked out on several occasions all the above propositions - 
without much success, judging from the articles by Spinelli and Fratianni. 
But the most serious objection that can be raised to both authors' arguments is that they choose as the 
object of their analysis the "general price level". It seems impossible to deny that the behaviour of various 
important categories of prices differs considerably both in the short and in the long run. To be sure, it is not 
only a question of market forms - a proposition that I have never maintained; it is also a question of the 
technical conditions of production and of the organization of the markets. Different behaviours imply 
different logics; if this is so, it is wrong to concentrate the analysis on the "general price level". The 
empirical results of such an analysis will not be particularly misleading only when the behaviour of the 
various categories of prices does not differ substantially, but it will be misleading when the differences are 
substantial. (In any case, the logical validity of the approach is much more important than any empirical 
result.) Fratianni illustrates the tests of two explanations of inflation: the "dominant impulse hypothesis" 
(DIH) and the "Phillips curve and mark-up pricing" (PCMP). In DIH, the author considers the demand for 
output - which is conditioned by money -, the supply of output and the internal and the foreign price levels 
(actual and expected); in the PCMP model he refers to the work by Modigliani and Tarantelli (1972) and 
considers two equations 
 
 
 
where W is the wage rate in industry, E is an index of excess demand in the labour market (which can be 
quantified either by the inverse of unemployment or by a more sophisticated index with a similar meaning), 
P is the internal price level, PR is the average productivity in industry and PM the foreign price level; ∆ 
indicates a rate of change and the bar over a variable indicates an expected value. 
The empirical results are good in both cases, though - so it seems statistically better for DIH. 
First of all, I would like to observe that the PMCP model can be found almost literally, with reference 
to manufacturing industry, in my 1967 essay that Fratianni quotes in his bibliography, so that I found my 
self in the peculiar situation of being criticized in Sections II and III and implicitly praised in Section V. 
From the standpoint of the statistical "forecasting power" of the two models, DIH seems superior, but, 
from a theoretical point of view, this is not so. In fact, looking carefully at the different coefficients in the 
three estimates, in each of them, at least one of the theoretically important variables is not significant. What 
really matters, however, is the concept which is taken as the object of the analysis, that is, the general price 
level. If it is true that this is, in principle, a misleading concept, then strictly speaking both tests are to be 
rejected, and it would be necessary to estimate different equations for different categories of prices and 
unify them only at the end of the analysis, for statistical and illustrative purposes. In particular, the second 
equation of the PCMP model can be criticized on two grounds. First, one can safely assume that the mark-
up pricing applies to the industrial products; it does not apply, for instance, to agricultural prices. Further 
differences and complications arise in considering services, rents and the relations between wholesale and 
retail prices. In short, that model can be applied to wholesale industrial prices, not to the cost of living. 
Second, "import prices" cannot be taken as a homogenous variable; at least two categories of import prices 
must be distinguished, the former - raw material prices - relevant as an element of cost in manufacturing, 
the latter - prices of finished products - relevant as a limit to the increases of domestic industrial prices. In 
other words, the former is a moving floor, the latter is a moving ceiling: the two must not be put together. 
When considering properly the PCMP model, that is, applying it only to the manufacturing industry, then 
the forecasting errors noticed by Fratianni in the period 1953-1977 (in 1958, 1970, 1976 and 1977) will 
practically disappear. The further step is to include that model in a larger model, embracing different 
categories of prices as well as several other economic variables. In such a framework, the role of money, 
too, will appear in its proper light: that role is not negligible but neither is it so decisive in determining 
inflation (as well as other economic changes) as most monetarists claim. 
Roma 
PAOLO SYLOS LABINI 
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